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Abstract
For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational
incentives is positively correlated with firm size. Firms that sell more products or
services were thought more likely to be trustworthy than those that sell less because
larger firms have more to lose if consumers decide they have behaved badly. That
assumption has been called into question by recent work that shows that, under the
standard infinitely repeated game model of reputation, reputational economies of scale
will occur only under special conditions, such as monopoly, because larger firms not
only have more to lose from behaving badly, but also more to gain. This article shows
that reputational economies of scale exist even when there is competition and without
other special conditions, if the probability that low quality is detected is positively
correlated with the quantity of the good or service sold. It also shows that reputational
economies of scale exist, under some circumstances, in a finite-horizon model of
reputation. Reputational economies of scale help explain why law and accounting
firms can act as gatekeepers, why mass market products are more likely to be safe,
why firms are less likely to exploit one-sided contracts than consumers, and why
manufacturers market new products under the umbrella of established trademarks.
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1. Introduction
For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational incentives
is positively correlated with firm size. The conventional wisdom was that firms that sell more
products or services are more likely to be trustworthy than those that sell less because larger
firms have more to lose if consumers decide they have behaved badly. This assumption helps
explain why law and accounting firms can act as gatekeepers, why mass market products are
more likely to be safe, why firms are less likely to exploit one-sided contracts than consumers,
and why manufacturers market new products under the umbrella of established trademarks
(Kraakman 1984 p. 891, Coffee 2006 p. 136, S. Choi 1998, Barnett 2012, Polinsky & Shavell
2010 p. 1491, Bebchuk & Posner 2006 p. 832, but see Macey 2013 Chapters 6 and 7).
Nevertheless, articles by Eric Rasmusen (2016) and Edward Iacobucci (2012) call into
question the assumption of reputational economies of scale. They assert that, under the infinitely
repeated game model of reputational enforcement, there is no advantage to firms that sell more.
While firms that sell greater quantities have more to lose if they misbehave, they also have more
to gain from misbehaving, and these two effects offset each other precisely. Instead, Rasmusen
and Iacobucci assert that there are reputational economies of scale only under special
circumstances, such as monopoly. Rasmusen and Iacobucci’s work is consistent with prior work
that shows reputational economies of scale exist because those prior articles assume an infinitehorizon model in which sellers are able to price monopolistically (Rob & Fishman 2005, Cai &
Obara 2009, J. Choi 1998, Wernerfelt, 1988).1
This article argues that reputational economies of scale exist under the infinitely repeated
game model of reputation, even when there is competition and without other special conditions.
The infinitely repeated game reputation model requires only minor adjustment in order to
generate reputational economies of scale. The only modification necessary is to assume that low
quality is detected with probability less than one and that the probability of detection is
positively correlated with the quantity sold. This assumption is valid for nearly all situations to
which reputational enforcement is usually applied. For example, if a manufacturer skimps on the
safety of its products, the probability that any one product will cause an accident is likely to be
less than one. Nevertheless, if the manufacturer sells many products, it is quite likely that there
will be accidents. As it sells more low-quality products, there will be more accidents and more
bad publicity, and consumers are more likely to choose to buy other products. Similarly, if an
accounting firm is not rigorous in an audit of a single company in a single year, the probability
1

Rogerson (1983) shows that higher quality firms tend to have more customers in a model with
competition, although he assumes that firms “make a once-and-for-all quality choice upon entering the
market” and therefore do not face that moral hazard problem (temptation to shirk on quality) that
characterizes most of the literature. Helpful surveys on reputation include Bar-Isaac & Tadelis 2008,
MacLeod 2007, Mailath & Samuelson 2006.
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that its lack of rigor will become known is less than one. Nevertheless, if an accounting firm is
consistently sloppy in its audits of many companies, the low quality of its audits will eventually
damage its reputation.
Rasmusen and Iacobucci’s argument against reputational economies of scale applies with
almost equal force to finite-horizon models of reputation, such as the models developed by Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In fact, even with monopoly, there are no
reputational economies of scale in simple-finite horizon models. Nevertheless, the same
modification – that the probability of detection is positively correlated with quantity sold – is
also sufficient to generate reputational economies of scale in a finite horizon model of reputation
when the firm sells high quality in all but the last period.
Section 2 briefly sets out the point made by Rasmusen and Iacobucci that, under the basic
infinitely repeated game model of reputation, there are no reputational economies of scale.
Section 3 modifies the basic model by assuming that the probability of detection is less than one.
It shows that the minimum quality-assuring price decreases with the volume of sales. Section 4
analyzes the umbrella branding context and shows that a firm that uses the same trademark for
two products can credibly commit to high quality at a lower price. Section 5 analyzes
reputational economies of scale under a finite horizon model with two types. Section 6 discusses
caveats, extensions, and possible reputational diseconomies of scale, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Lack of Economies of Scale in the Basic Infinite-Horizon Model
This section generally follows Rasmusen’s (2016) formalization of Klein and Leffler’s 1981
article, with modifications noted in the footnotes.2 This model has two features that make it
especially appropriate for the analysis of reputational economies of scale: there are no fixed
costs, and marginal costs are constant. By eliminating two non-reputation-related factors that
create economies of scale, this model allows one to focus on the scale effects of reputation. In
order to examine the effects of scale, we will initially assume that firm size is exogenous and
then show whether larger firms can credibly commit to sell high quality at lower prices.
If the incentive-compatibility constraint for larger firms is consistent with selling higher
quality a lower price than the incentive-compatibility constraint for smaller firms, we will say
that there are reputational economies of scale. This is consistent with Rasmusen (2016), which
focuses on whether high quality is “viable” at lower prices for multi-product firms. We will also
show that, when there are reputational economies of scale, the lower price is part of the most
plausible grim-trigger equilibrium, and that if both large and small firms could enter the market,
the most plausible equilibrium would involve the larger firms making all the high-quality sales
and smaller firms exiting the market.

2

Where this section differs, it mostly takes features from closely related models in Rasmusen
(1989) and (2007).
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Because infinitely repeated games have many equilibria, the propositions in the paper will
focus on the incentive-compatibility constraint. Like Rasmusen (2016), this paper focuses on
grim-trigger equilibria, because they are more tractable and are relatively common in a number
of settings. Other equilibrium strategies are, of course, possible, but they are more complicated
and are likely to result in similar properties with respect to scale.
In each period, there are 𝑁 > 1 potential firms that may participate in the market by selling
at least one unit of the relevant good.3 A firm that chooses not to participate gets a payoff of
zero. Each period, each firm can choose to make products of high or low quality. Quality cannot
be observed by consumers at the time of purchase. It costs a firm 𝑐 > 0, paid at the end of the
relevant period, to produce a unit of the high quality good; it costs zero to produce the low
quality good.4 Each period, each firm chooses its price p. There is a large number of consumers,
𝑄 > 𝑁, each of whom is willing to pay up to v for one unit of the high-quality good, and is
willing to pay zero for the low-quality good.5 Each period, consumers choose to purchase at most
one unit of the good and which firm to buy it from. The amount consumers buy, in aggregate, in
each period from firm i is denoted qi, and firms receive the payment at the end of the period. As
noted in the first paragraph of this section, qi is treated as exogenous, at least initially.6 After
purchasing the good, each consumer learns the quality of the good she purchased and can use
that knowledge to determine which firm to purchase from in the next period. Knowledge is
shared among all consumers. The discount rate is 𝑟 > 0. The game repeats infinitely. Since this
is an infinitely repeated game, there are many equilibria. The equilibria of interest, however, are
those that sustain the production of high-quality goods. The exposition below is confined to
ascertaining the conditions for such equilibria.
We focus on the incentive-compatibility constraint. That is, under what conditions is it
rational for a firm to sell high-quality rather than low-quality? Because, as discussed below, the
equilibrium of interest involves a grim-trigger strategy, we will focus on 2 alternatives: (1)
producing qi units of high-quality products in every period and receiving a price, 𝑝, and (2)
Rasmusen (2016) does not specify the number firms when analyzing a “competitive industry,”
but merely states that “more than one firm can offer each product and they engage in price competition.”
(p. 266). For the analysis here, where quantity is a key variable of interest, it is helpful to specify the
number of firms, as in Rasmusen (1989, 2007).
4
Rasmusen (2016) assumes that low quality costs 𝑐 to produce and that high quality costs
(1 + 𝛾)𝑐 to produce. Without loss of generality, we normalize the cost of low quality to zero and focus
only on the additional cost of producing high quality. This makes the math simpler and follows
Rasmusen (1989, 2007).
5
Rasmusen (2016) assumes a “max of size x of infinitesimal consumers…. willing to pay up to v
for low quality or (1 + 𝜃)𝑣 for high quality…” (p. 263). For the analysis here, where quantity is a key
variable of interest, it is helpful to have a have a whole number of consumers. In addition, like cost
discussed in the prior footnote, without loss of generality, we normalize consumer’s valuation of low
quality to zero to simplify the math.
6
As discussed in greater detail in footnote 7, this means that, if all firms sell the same number of
𝑄
high-quality goods and all consumers purchase high quality, then 𝑁 = 𝑞𝑖.
3
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producing qi units of low quality in the first period, getting the high price in the first period, and
then receiving zero profits in every other period:
𝑞𝑖 (𝑝−𝑐)
𝑟

𝑞𝑝

𝑖
≥ 1+𝑟

(1)

A little algebra shows that the lowest price, 𝑝∗ , consistent with the incentive compatibility
constraint is:
𝑝∗ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑐

(2)

𝑝∗ is the quality-guaranteeing price. It is the minimum price that gives a firm an incentive to sell
high-quality goods. Note that the quality-assuring price does not vary with the quantity sold by
each firm, 𝑞𝑖 . The reason, as pointed out by Iacobucci (2012), is that larger firms both have more
to lose in the long run by forfeiting the profits generated by high-quality products and have more
to gain in the short run by selling low-quality, cheaper products, at the high-quality price. These
two effects cancel each other out completely in the basic model, so large firms and small firms
have exactly the same incentive to sell high quality and to deviate from high quality and sell low
quality in an attempt to fool the public and gain short-term profits.
Consider the following simple equilibrium. Each firm sells high quality every period and
charges 𝑝∗ . If a firm deviates to low quality, it sells low quality in every subsequent period for
zero. Each consumer’s strategy is as follows. If there is at least one firm that has never sold low
quality, then the consumer purchases one unit from such a firm that is offering the product at the
lowest price greater than or equal to 𝑝∗ as long as that price is lower than v. If there are several
firms selling the product at the same low price greater than or equal to 𝑝∗ , that have not sold lowquality in the past, then each consumer chooses among those firms randomly and it is assumed
that purchases, in aggregate, are spread equally among the firms. If there are no firms which
have never sold low quality and that are selling at price greater than or equal to 𝑝∗ but lower than
v, the consumer buys one unit of low quality or buys nothing. Consumers believe that a firm
selling a good for 𝑝∗ is selling high quality. Out of equilibrium, if a firm deviates to 𝑝 < 𝑝∗ , the
consumer believes that the firm is producing low quality; if a firm deviates to 𝑝 > 𝑝∗ , the
consumer believes the firm is producing high quality.
It is easy to confirm that the previous paragraph describes an equilibrium in which firms
sell high quality if 𝑣 > 𝑝∗ . Firms will not deviate and sell low quality (or nothing), because 𝑝∗
was defined as the price at which the firm was indifferent between producing high quality and
low quality (or nothing); producing low quality in one period generates profits in that period, but
zero profits in all later periods, because consumers refuse to buy from the firm. Similarly, firms
will not deviate and charge a higher price, because then they would have no sales and earn zero.
Since, according to (2), 𝑝∗ generates profits for the firm, it would rather sell high quality at 𝑝∗
than earn nothing. If a firm did deviate and sell low quality, it would continue to sell low quality
or sell nothing in all future periods, because consumers would never pay the high-quality price to
5

purchase from them again. Given that firms are producing high quality and selling at 𝑝∗ , it is
rational for consumers to buy at that price from any firm that has not sold low quality. Given that
a firm that has sold low quality once will always sell low quality or sell nothing, it is rational for
consumers never to buy from such a firm. Consumer beliefs are also rational, because firms
charging 𝑝∗ or more have an incentive to sell high quality, while firms charging less do better by
producing low quality (or not producing anything at all). 7
Note that there would not be an equilibrium in which firms sell high quality with a price
lower than 𝑝∗ , because firms would do better by producing low quality. Note also that there
could be an equilibrium in which all firms sold high quality and sold their goods at a price higher
than 𝑝∗ , but it would require consumers to believe that firms that sold between 𝑝∗ and the
equilibrium price were producing low quality, which is irrational. There are, of course, other
equilibria. For example, it would be an equilibrium for consumers only to buy low-quality and
firms only to sell low-quality. Also, there are equilibria in which consumers punish firms that
sell low-quality for a finite number of periods. For simplicity and in order to focus on
reputational economies of scale, this paper, like Rasmusen (2016), analyzes only grim trigger
strategies that result in the production of high-quality products.
Having described the equilibrium of interest, we can turn to the issue of primary concern:
reputational economies of scale.
Proposition 1. There are no reputational economies of scale in the basic infinite-horizon
model.
Proof. The proof follows simply from the incentive-compatibility constraint, (1), and the
quality assuring price, (2). The lowest price consistent with the incentive compatibility
constraint does not vary by quantity, qi. Firms that sell larger qualities cannot credibly
sell high-quality at a lower price when those producing lower quantities.
Given that larger firms and small firms have the same incentive compatibility constraint
and can credibly sell high-quality goods at the same price, it is also possible that there is an
equilibrium in which firms of different sizes all sell in the same market. For example, if,
consumers chose firms randomly from among those selling at or above 𝑝∗ and that had not sold

7

In this equilibrium, all potential firms enter the market and every consumer buys one unit. This
makes sense if the number of firms equals the number of consumers divided by the quantity term sells,
𝑄
𝑁 = 𝑞𝑖. In Rasmusen (1989, 2007) there is a fixed cost, F, of entry that ensures that all firms make zero
profits and determines the number of firms that enter. As in Rasmusen (2016), the model here assumes
zero fixed cost and some exogenous limit on the number of firms that can enter the market so that
competition is consistent with positive profits and so the aggregate supply equals aggregate demand.
𝑞 (𝑝∗ −𝑐)
Alternatively, one could assume fixed costs, 𝐹 = 𝑖 𝑟
= 𝑐𝑞𝑖 . If one takes this approach, the number
𝑄

of firms is endogenous, 𝑁 = 𝑞𝑖 =

𝑄𝑐
.
𝐹

6

low quality goods, but were more likely to choose some firms over others, some firms would
have a larger quantities, but the price would be the same. For example, if there were 𝑁𝐿 large
firms, 𝑁𝑆 small firms, and 𝑄 consumers with 𝑣 > 𝑝∗ , then it would be an equilibrium for each
consumer to choose to purchase a product with probability 3(𝑁
probability 3(𝑁

1
𝐿 + 𝑁𝑆 )

2
𝐿 + 𝑁𝑆 )

from each large firm and

from each small firm, for large firms to sell twice as much a small firms, for

all firms to sell at same price, 𝑝∗ , and for all to sell high-quality.8
3. Reputational Economies of Scale When Low Quality Is Detected With Probability Less
Than One
A key assumption in the prior section was that consumers detect and punish low quality with
probability one at the end of each period. That is obviously unrealistic. It is more reasonable to
assume that consumers detect and punish low quality with probability less than one, but that the
probability increases as the firm sells more low-quality goods. That is, let 𝑠(𝑘𝑖 ) be the
probability that consumers detect and punish low quality if 𝑘𝑖 low quality units are sold, where
0 ≤ 𝑘𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑠(0) = 0 , lim 𝑠(𝑘𝑖 ) = 1, 𝑠′ > 0, and 𝑠 ′′ < 0. The assumption that the second
𝑘𝑖 →∞

derivative is negative follows largely (but not entirely) from the idea that 𝑠(𝑘𝑖 ) is increasing but
must take values between zero and one, whereas 𝑘𝑖 can be any positive real number. That means
that the second derivative would need to be negative over most of its range (although it could be
zero or positive over some intervals). It simplifies the math to assume that the second derivative
is always negative. The probability of detection and punishment might increase because media
are more likely to publicize defects in products that are more widely distributed.9 Another
possible mechanism would be to assume that the probability with which the low quality of any
particular unit purchased is detected is 𝜌 , 0 < 𝜌 < 1, and independent. One could then interpret
𝑠 to be the probability that low quality is detected in at least one unit sold by a firm in a given
period, under the assumption that consumers will punish the firm if it sells any low quality.
Under this interpretation, if 𝑘𝑖 low quality units are sold, 𝑠 = 1 − (1 − 𝜌)𝑘𝑖 . Another
interpretation might be that 𝑠(𝑘𝑖 ) is the fraction of consumers who refuse to buy from the firm
that has sold low quality. That probability might go up with the number of low-quality units sold,
because knowledge of low quality is more likely to diffuse, either through word of mouth or
through media, when the number of defective products is larger.
Assume provisionally that the firm sells either all high quality or all low quality, that is 𝑘𝑖 ∈
{0, 𝑞𝑖 }. Appendix A shows that this assumption is justified, because it would not be rational for a
8

For different firm sizes to be consistent with free entry and zero profits, as discussed in the
previous footnote, large and small firms would have to have different fixed costs. That is, fixed costs
would have to be proportional to output. This makes sense: firms with greater capacity need to invest
more in plant and equipment.
9
Large firms may, however, may be better able to manipulate the media or mitigate the effects of
negative publicity through their own advertising and public relations. The author thanks Joshua
Teitelbaum for this insight.
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firm to sell some high and some low quality.10 Because the probability of detection, 𝑠, increases
with the quantity of low-quality goods, the incentive-compatibility constraint – see (1) above –
needs to be modified to take into account that cheating is discovered with probability less than
one. The payoff of consistently producing high quality remains the same, but the payoff to
producing low quality is more complicated, because a firm producing low quality goods may
now get the high payoff for several periods until the low quality of its products is detected:
𝑞𝑖 (𝑝−𝑐)
𝑟

≥

𝑞𝑖 𝑝
1+𝑟

𝑞𝑖 𝑝

+ (1 − 𝑆)

(1+𝑟)2

∞

≥ ∑(1 − 𝑠)

𝑞𝑖 𝑝
(1+𝑟)3

+⋯

(3)

𝑞𝑖 𝑝

𝑗−1

𝑗=1

+(1 − 𝑠)2

(1 + 𝑟)

𝑗

∞

𝑞𝑖 𝑝
1−𝑠 𝑗
≥
∑(
)
(1 + 𝑟)
1+𝑟
𝑗=0

≥

𝑞𝑖 𝑝
1
(
)
(1 + 𝑟) 1 − (1 − 𝑠)
1+𝑟
≥

𝑞𝑖 𝑝
𝑟+𝑠

Changing the inequality to an equality and solving for 𝑝 yields the quality-assuring price. Let 𝑝′∗
denote the quality-assuring price under the assumptions in this section (e.g. that the probability
of detection is less than one):

𝑝′∗ =

(𝑟+𝑠)𝑐
𝑠

=

𝑟𝑐
𝑠

+𝑐

10

(4)

Although the literature often assumes that firms are constrained to offering either all highquality or all low-quality, it is useful to check that the quality assuring price does not give firms an
incentive to produce some high quality and some low-quality product. After all, this and most other
models in the literature assume fixed marginal cost, so there is no loss in economies of scale if a firm
chose to produce some high quality and some low quality. Appendix A proves that, under the quality
assuring price in Equation (4), a firm rationally produces all high quality rather than a mixture of
qualities. This result could also by justified if one assumed that producing the fixed cost, F, was incurred
for each quality, e.g. if each quality required a different factory and/or separate management structure.

8

As one would expect, as the probability of detection, 𝑠, goes to one, 𝑝′∗ in (4) converges to 𝑝∗ in
(2). Note, however, that since 𝑠 is a function of quantity, the quality-assuring price now varies
with the quantity sold by each firm, 𝑞𝑖 . In particular, as 𝑞𝑖 approaches infinity, 𝑠 approaches
one, and price approaches (1 + 𝑟)𝑐. On the other hand, as 𝑞𝑖 approaches zero, 𝑠 approaches 0,
and 𝑝′∗ approaches infinity. It is relatively easy to see that 𝑝′∗ is a strictly monotonically
decreasing function of 𝑞𝑖 . This makes intuitive sense. When quantity is low, the probability of
detection is low, so the firm needs a high price to make it worthwhile not to cheat. This is closely
related to the standard result in the economic analysis of crime, where optimal sanctions increase
as the probability of detection goes down (Becker (1968), Stigler (1970)). In the reputation
model, the “sanction” for cheating is loss of the rents produced by receiving the high price in
every period. On the other hand, as the probability of detection increases, the firm finds it
profitable to sell high quality even if the price is lower.
This is the key result of the paper. Since the quality-assuring price for a firm goes down
as the firm sells higher quantities, the larger firm has an advantage. It can sell at a lower price
and still have an incentive to sell high quality. This is the meaning of reputational economies of
scale and leads directly to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. There are reputational economies of scale in the infinite-horizon model
when low quality is detected with probability less than one.
Proof. The proof follows simply from the quality-assuring price, (4). The lowest price
consistent with the incentive-compatibility constraint, (3), varies with, 𝑠, the probability
that low quality will be detected: as that probability goes up, the quality assuring price
goes down. Because that probability, 𝑠, is an increasing function of quantity, 𝑞𝑖 , firms
that sell larger qualities can credibly sell high-quality at a lower price than those
producing lower quantities.
Other than the relevant price being 𝑝′∗ rather than 𝑝∗ , the equilibrium described in the prior
section works equally well for the model described here where the probability of detection of
low quality is less than one.11 Because the quality-assuring price varies with quantity, there is no
plausible equilibrium with both large and small firms producing high quality. For such an
equilibrium to exist, the price paid to smaller firms would have to be the higher price necessary
to give such firms an incentive to sell high quality. This means consumers must be either (a)
willing to pay different prices to small and large firms selling goods of the same quality, or (b)
unwilling to purchase high-quality goods at lower prices from larger firms. (a) is incompatible
11

𝑞𝑖

To make the equilibrium consistent with free entry and zero profits, fixed costs would be 𝐹 =
(𝑟+𝑠)𝑐
𝑠𝐹
. Substituting 𝑝′∗ = 𝑠 , we can derive the equilibrium quantity, 𝑞𝑖′∗ = 𝑐 , and number of firms,

(𝑝′∗ −𝑐)
𝑟

𝑄

𝑛′∗ = 𝑞′∗ . Note that there would need to be some additional, but relatively trivial, constraints on
𝑖

parameters 𝑠, 𝐹, and 𝑐 in order for 𝑞𝑖′∗ to be at least 1 and 𝑛′∗ to be at least 2.
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with consumer rationality. If consumers believed that even larger firms were selling low quality
if they sold at prices between the quality-assuring price for large and small firms, then there is an
equilibrium (b) in which all firms received the high price necessary to induce even smaller firms
to sell high-quality, and both large and small firms could exist in the same market. Nevertheless,
this seems implausible because it would require consumers to believe that large firms would sell
low quality when selling at a price for which it would be advantageous for them to sell high
quality.
It should be noted that the equilibrium described in this section is informationally
demanding. Both consumers and firms need to know the quality-assuring price, and this requires
that both consumers and firms know the cost of producing high quality goods, the discount rate,
and the probability that low quality will be detected, and the number of goods sold by each firm.
The need for the first two pieces of information is a characteristic of the basic infinitely repeated
game model of reputation. The need for the other information is, however, an additional
requirement of the modified model presented in this section. Rasmusen and Perri (2001) suggest,
using a more sophisticated model, that it might be possible to relax some of these informational
requirements. Further research could explore the extent to which the results in this section are
robust to parties estimating the parameters with error. In the real world, consumers do seem to
have some sense that certain low prices are “too good to be true.” This suggests that the model’s
prediction that consumers would refuse to buy from firms that charged too low a price has some
plausibility.
4. Umbrella Branding
Now consider what would happen if some firms sell multiple goods while others sell only
one good. For simplicity, suppose there are two goods, A and B, and three types of firms, firms
that sell only A, firms that sell only B, and firms that sell both A and B. This section will show
that firms that sell both A and B will be able to sell high quality of both A and B at lower prices
than firms that sell only A or only B. This establishes the core idea of reputational economies of
scale – larger firms that sell more products have a competitive advantage over smaller ones. The
intuition for this result is the same as for the result in the previous section. A firm that sells both
goods sells more total goods, so, because the quality-assuring price falls with quantity, the firm
selling both goods will be able to credibly sell high-quality goods at a lower cost. Nevertheless,
the math demonstrating this result is more complicated.
The analysis in this section depends crucially on how consumers react to the detection of
low quality in one product sold by a firm that sells multiple products. If a consumer purchases
product A and it turns out to be of low quality, the consumer might cease purchasing product A
from that firm, but still purchase product B from it. Or, such a consumer might shun all products
from that firm, that is, avoid purchasing both A and B from it. If consumers behave in the former
way – treating low quality in one product as irrelevant to the quality of other products sold by the
same firm – then there is no advantage to the two-product firm. On the other hand, if, as seems
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plausible, consumers interpret low quality in one product to mean that the firm is cutting corners
on both products, then it makes sense for them to refuse to purchase A or B from that firm. If so,
a new and interesting equilibrium arises. That is the equilibrium that will be analyzed in the rest
of this section. This equilibrium is plausible in situations where a firm has chosen to market two
or more products under the same trademark – for example, several different car models under the
trademark “Toyota” or several types of toothpaste under the trademark “Colgate.” In these
situations, it is plausible that consumers assume that quality standards are similar for all products
marketed under the same “umbrella trademark.”
Our notation needs to be modified to reflect that there are now two different goods. There
is a large number of consumers, 𝑄 > 𝑁, each of whom is willing to pay up to 𝑣𝐴 for one unit of
high-quality good A, up to 𝑣𝐵 for one unit of high-quality good B, and zero for the low-quality
of A or B. Denote the quantity of good A sold by firm 𝑖 as 𝑞𝐴𝑖 , and the quantity of good B sold
by such a firm as 𝑞𝐵𝑖 . As in previous sections, these quantities will initially be assumed to be
exogenous. Denote the cost of producing high quality of each good as 𝑐𝐴 > 0 and 𝑐𝐵 > 0. Let
𝑠𝐴𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 ) be the probability that low quality is detected and punished if the firm sells 𝑘𝐴𝑖 low
quality units of product A, but either no product B or only high quality of product B. Let
𝑠𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) be the probability that low quality is detected and punished, if the firm sells 𝑘𝐵𝑖 low
quality units of product B, but either no product A or only high quality of product A. Let
𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) be the probability that low quality is detected and punished, if the firm sells
𝑘𝐴𝑖 low-quality units of A and 𝑘𝐵𝑖 low quality units of B. 0 ≤ 𝑘𝐴𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝐴𝑖 and 0 ≤ 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝐵𝑖 . As
with the one good case, assume 𝑠𝑢𝑖 (0) = 0 , lim 𝑠𝑢𝑖 (𝑘𝑢𝑖 ) = 1, 𝑠𝑢′ 𝑖 > 0, and 𝑠𝑢𝑖 ′′ < 0, where
𝑘𝑢𝑖 →∞

𝑢 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. Similarly, 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (0,0) = 0, 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (0, 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) = 𝑠𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐵𝑖 ), 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 0) = 𝑠𝐴𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 ),
lim

𝑘𝐴𝑖 +𝑘𝐵𝑖 →∞

𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) = 1,

𝑑𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖
𝑑𝑘𝑢𝑖

> 0 and

𝑑2 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖
𝑑2 𝑘𝑢𝑖

> 0. Note that these assumptions imply that if

the firm sells positive quantities of both low quality A and B, then 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) > 𝑠𝐴𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 ) and
𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) > 𝑠𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐵𝑖 ). This makes sense, because if two firms sell the same number of low
quality goods of kind A, and one of them also sells low-quality goods of kind B, it is more likely
that the firm that sells two types of low-quality goods will be caught. After all, the probability
that the two-good firm is caught making low-quality goods of kind A should be the same as the
probability that the one-good firm is caught making low-quality goods of kind A, but the twogood firm also has some probability of being caught making low-quality goods of kind B. Under
the interpretation that the probabilities with which the low quality of any particular unit
purchased of good A or B is detected are 𝜌𝐴 > 0 and 𝜌𝐵 > 0, where these two probabilities are
independent, 𝑠𝐴𝑖 = 1 − (1 − 𝜌𝐴 )𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑠𝐵𝑖 = 1 − (1 − 𝜌𝐵 )𝑘𝐵𝑖 , and 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 = 𝑠𝐴𝑖 + 𝑠𝐵𝑖 −𝑠𝐴𝑖 𝑠𝐵𝑖 = 1 −
(1 − 𝜌𝐴 )𝑘𝐴𝑖 (1 − 𝜌𝐵 )𝑘𝐵𝑖 . Note that, under this interpretation, the assumptions made above, that
𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) > 𝑠𝐴𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 ) and 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) > 𝑠𝐵𝑖 (𝑘𝐵𝑖 ), are always true when the firm sells both
low goods of both goods (e.g. 𝑘𝐴𝑖 > 0 and 𝑘𝐵𝑖 > 0).
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As in the previous section, assume provisionally that the firm does not mix high and low
quality for a given product. That is, if the firm sells A, all units of A are high quality or all are
low quality. Similarly, if the firm sells B, all units of B are high quality or all are low quality.
Appendix A shows that this assumption is justified, because it would not be rational for a firm to
sell some high and some low quality of each product.
As in the previous sections, start with the incentive-compatibility constraints. There are
now three.
C1. High quality on both A and B at least as profitable as low quality on both A and B:
′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 (𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

𝑟

≥

′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 𝑝𝐴
+𝑞𝐵𝑖 𝑝𝐵

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 )

C2. High quality on both A and B at least as profitable as high quality on B and low
quality on A:
′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 (𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

𝑟

≥

′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 𝑝𝐴
+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )

C3. High quality on both A and B at least as profitable as high quality on A and low
quality on B:
′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 (𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

𝑟

≥

′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 (𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 𝑝𝐵

(𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )

Because there is not a unique pair of quality-assuring prices, (𝑝𝐴′∗ , 𝑝𝐵′∗ ), identification of the
quality-assuring prices is deferred to the proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Umbrella branding creates reputational economies of scale in the infinitehorizon model when low quality is detected with probability less than one. That is, a twoproduct firm that sells 𝑞𝐴𝑖 of product A and 𝑞𝐵𝑖 of product B can credibly sell high
quality of both products at a lower price than one-product firms that sell only 𝑞𝐴𝑖 of
product A or 𝑞𝐵𝑖 of product B.
Proof. Consider first Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. If firms selling both A and B choose prices and quantities that would be
quality-assuring for firms selling just A or just B, then constraints C1, C2, and C3
would be satisfied with strict inequalities. That is, if, following (4) above,
𝑝𝐴′ =

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴𝑖

and 𝑝𝐵′ =

(𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵𝑖

inequalities.
12

, then C1, C2 and C3 would hold with strict

Proof of Lemma. First consider C1. To prove:
′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 (𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

>

𝑟

Substitute 𝑝𝐴′ =

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴

and 𝑝𝐵′ =

𝑠𝐴𝑖

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴 )𝑐𝐴
𝑖
𝑠𝐴
𝑖

𝑞𝐴𝑖 (

′
′
𝑞𝐴𝑖 𝑝𝐴
+𝑞𝐵𝑖 𝑝𝐵

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 )

(𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
𝑠 𝐵𝑖

and simplify:

(𝑟+𝑠𝐵 )𝑐𝐵
𝑖
−𝑐𝐵 )
𝑠𝐵
𝑖

−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (
𝑟

𝑞𝐴𝑖 𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴𝑖

+

𝑞 𝐵 𝑖 𝑐𝐵
𝑠 𝐵𝑖

>

𝑞𝐴𝑖 𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴𝑖

(

𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖

)+

>

𝑞𝐴𝑖

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 )

𝑞 𝐵 𝑖 𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵𝑖

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴 )𝑐𝐴
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵 )𝑐𝐵
𝑖
𝑖
+𝑞𝐵𝑖
𝑠𝐴
𝑠𝐵
𝑖
𝑖

(

𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖
𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖

)

𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 > 𝑠𝐴𝑖 > 0 and 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 > 𝑠𝐵𝑖 > 0 (see p. 11), so the above inequality always
holds.
Next consider C2: To prove:
′∗
′∗
𝑞𝐴𝑖 (𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

𝑟

As with C1, substitute 𝑝𝐴′∗ =

>

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴𝑖

′∗
′∗
𝑞𝐴𝑖 𝑝𝐴
+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )

and 𝑝𝐵′∗ =

(𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵𝑖

and simplify:

𝑞𝐴𝑖 𝑐𝐴 𝑞𝐵𝑖 𝑐𝐵
𝑞𝐴 𝑐𝐴 𝑞𝐵 𝑐𝐵
𝑟
+
> 𝑖 + 𝑖 (
)
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝑠𝐵𝑖
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝑠𝐵𝑖 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝑟 > 0 and 𝑠𝐴𝑖 > 0, so the above inequality always holds.
Similar reasoning shows that C3 also holds with strict inequality. Q.E.D.
Now we need to define and prove the existence of quality-assuring prices,
In prior sections, the quality-assuring price was found by solving the
incentive-compatibility constraint as an equality. Unfortunately, in general, there is no
pair of prices, (𝑝𝐴′∗ , 𝑝𝐵′∗ ), that satisfies all three incentive-compatibility constraints – C1,
C2, and C3 – if they are set to equality. So, we will say that a pair of prices is a qualityassuring price if at least one of the three incentive-compatibility constraints holds with
equality. Unfortunately, there are an infinite number of such pairs. For our purposes, it is
sufficient to identify and prove the existence of a single such pair.
(𝑝𝐴′∗ , 𝑝𝐵′∗ ).

Consider ordered pairs, (𝑝𝐴 , 𝑝𝐵 ) and, in particular the set of ordered pairs
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
).
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

constituting the line segment between (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 ) and (
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The first point

is defined by the marginal cost of producing each good, and the second point is defined
by the quality-assuring prices when a firm sells only good A or only good B. Note that at
(𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 ), C1, C2, and C3 will be each violated, because the left-hand sides will be zero
and the right-hand sides will be positive. Note also that, according to Lemma 1, at
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
),
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

(

C1, C2 and C3 each hold with strict inequalities.

Now consider what happens to C1 as one moves along the line from
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
)
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

to (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 ). Since the inequality in C1 holds strictly at

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
,
)
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝑠 𝐵𝑖

and is violated at (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 ), and since both sides vary continuously

(
(

with 𝑝𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵 , there must be a place on the line between those two points where the lefthand and right-hand sides are equal. If there is only one such point, call that point
(𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ). If there is more than one such point, denote as (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ) the one with the highest
value of 𝑝𝐴 . Note that, for all points on the line between (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ) and
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
),
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

(

C1 holds with strict inequality, because if it held with equality that

would violate the definition of (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ), and if the inequality did not hold at all, then,
because of continuity, there would have to be another point in that interval where C1 held
with equality, which would also violate the definition of (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ).
By similar reasoning, let (𝑥2 , 𝑦2 ) be the sole point where C2 holds with equality
on the line segment between (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 ) and (

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
)
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

or the one with the

highest value of 𝑝𝐴 . C2 will hold with strict inequality for every point between (𝑥2 , 𝑦2 )
and (

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
).
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

By similar reasoning, let (𝑥3 , 𝑦3 ) be the sole point where C3 holds with equality
on the line segment between (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 ) and (

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
)
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

or the one with the

highest value of 𝑝𝐴 . C3 will hold with strict inequality for every point between (𝑥3 , 𝑦3 )
and (

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
).
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

Let

(𝑝𝐴′∗ , 𝑝𝐵′∗ )

(𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ) if 𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥2 and 𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥3
= {(𝑥2 , 𝑦2 ) if 𝑥2 > 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 ≥ 𝑥3
(𝑥3 , 𝑦3 ) if 𝑥3 > 𝑥1 and 𝑥3 > 𝑥2
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By construction, all 3 incentive-compatibility constraints – C1 through C3 – are
satisfied at these prices. In addition, by construction, these prices are lower than
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
),
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

(

the quality-assuring prices for firms selling only product A or

product B.12 Q.E.D.

As in the previous two sections, we now show that those prices are part of a plausible
equilibrium. Consider the following set of strategies that form a perfect equilibrium.
Let 𝑝𝐴′∗ and 𝑝𝐵′∗ be the pair of prices identified in the Proof of Proposition 3 as satisfying
incentive-compatibility constraints C1-C3.
(1) If there is at least one firm that has never sold low quality, then the consumer
purchases one unit of A from such a firm that is offering the product at the lowest price
greater than or equal to 𝑝𝐴′∗ as long as that price is lower than 𝑣𝐴 . If there are several firms
selling the product at the same low price greater than or equal to 𝑝𝐴′∗ , that have not sold
low-quality in the past, then each consumer chooses among those firms randomly and it
is assumed that purchases, in aggregate, are spread equally among the firms. If there are
no firms which have never sold low quality and that are selling at price greater than or
equal to 𝑝𝐴′∗ but lower than 𝑣𝐴 , the consumer buys no A. Consumers believe that a firm
selling a good for 𝑝𝐴′∗ is selling high quality. Out of equilibrium, if a firm deviates to 𝑝 <
𝑝𝐴′∗ , the consumer believes that the firm is producing low quality; if a firm deviates to
𝑝 > 𝑝𝐴′∗ , the consumer believes the firm is producing high quality.
(2) If there is at least one firm that has never sold low quality, then the consumer
purchases one unit of B from such a firm that is offering the product at the lowest price
greater than or equal to 𝑝𝐵′∗ as long as that price is lower than 𝑣𝐵 . If there are several firms
selling the product at the same low price greater than or equal to 𝑝𝐵′∗ , that have not sold
Note that there are an infinite number of ordered pairs (𝑝𝐴′∗ , 𝑝𝐵′∗ ), satisfying C1, C2, and C3.
Their existence can be proved by considering the family of curves (e.g. increasingly concave or convex
12

bowed-out lines) passing through (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 ) and (

(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝑖 )𝑐𝐴 (𝑟+𝑠𝐵𝑖 )𝑐𝐵
, 𝑠
),
𝑠𝐴𝑖
𝐵𝑖

but overlapping or intersecting the

straight line between those points only at the endpoints. By reasoning similar to the above for straight
lines, each of those curves will also have a point where at least one of C1, C2, and C3 hold with equality,
and that point will not be on the straight line, so it will be different than (𝑝𝐴′∗ , 𝑝𝐵′∗ ). For the purposes of
this paper, it is sufficient to prove that there is just one such ordered pairs. Consideration of additional
pairs satisfying the constraints introduces complications, such as how consumers coordinate on one pair
of prices. By just considering the pair whose existence was proved first, such complications can be
avoided.
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low quality in the past, then each consumer chooses among those firms randomly and it is
assumed that purchases, in aggregate, are spread equally among the firms. If there are no
firms which have never sold low quality and that are selling at price greater than or equal
to 𝑝𝐵′∗ but lower than 𝑣𝐵 , the consumer buys no B. Consumers believe that a firm selling
a good for 𝑝𝐵′∗ is selling high quality. Out of equilibrium, if a firm deviates to 𝑝 < 𝑝𝐵′∗ , the
consumer believes that the firm is producing low quality; if a firm deviates to 𝑝 > 𝑝𝐵′∗ ,
the consumer believes the firm is producing high quality.
(3) Firms that sell both A and B sell both at high quality and sell them at prices 𝑝𝐴′∗ and
𝑝𝐵′∗ respectively. If a firm deviates to low quality, it sells low quality of both A and B in
every subsequent period for zero.13
It is easy to confirm that those strategies form an equilibrium. Given that the prices
satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraints, it is in the best interest of firms to sell highquality and sell at those prices. Producing low quality yields a lower payoff. Charging a higher or
lower price also yields lower payoffs because there would be no sales and thus no profits. Given
that the firms are producing high quality and selling at those prices, it is in the best interests of
consumers to buy from them, assuming the prices are lower than 𝑣𝐴 and 𝑣𝐵 . Given consumer
beliefs, their off-equilibrium strategies are rational. Given firms’ incentive-compatibility
constraints, consumers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs are rational.
Given that two-product firms can sell high-quality goods at prices that would violate the
incentive-compatibility constraints of single-product firms, it is hard to imagine a plausible
equilibrium in which both two-product firms and single-product firms would coexist. The
reasoning is similar to that set out in the prior section about the implausibility of large and small
firms coexisting in the same market if low quality is detected with probability less than one:
larger firms can credibly commit to producing high quality at lower prices.
Note, of course, that there are many equilibria, including equilibria in which both twoproduct and single-product firms sell goods of similar quality. The most obvious (and
uninteresting) is the equilibrium in which consumers purchase only products sold at the lowquality price (here normalized to zero) and in which all firms sell only low quality. A more
13

To make the equilibrium consistent with free entry and zero profits, one needs, as in prior
sections, to introduce fixed costs. Let 𝐹𝐴 > 0, and 𝐹𝐵 > 0 be the fixed costs of producing A and B
respectively. As in the one-good case, these costs are paid at the beginning of the first period in which the
firm produces the relevant good. Note that 𝐹𝐴 does not depend on whether the firm produces one or two
goods, nor does 𝐹𝐵 . That is, there are no economies of scope attributable to the fixed costs. This
assumption, like the assumption of constant marginal costs, allows the analysis to focus economies scale
created by reputation rather than by technological factors. For each pair of quality-assuring prices
(𝑝𝐴′∗ , 𝑝𝐵′∗ ) and other parameters, there is a pair of fixed costs, (𝐹𝐴 , 𝐹𝐵 ) that assures zero profits and the
desired number of firms and quantities per firm. In the equilibrium set out in the text, 𝑞𝐴𝑖 = 𝑞𝐵𝑖 , because
consumers purchase the same amount of A and B. Different quantities could easily be obtained in
equilibrium by varying consumer demand.
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interesting equilibrium is one in which consumers favor single-product firms by buying from
them with higher probability, even if the single-product firm offers the good at the same price as
the two-product firm. By doing so, consumers could negate the scale advantage of the twoproduct firm by purchasing, in aggregate, more of the single good from the single-product firm.
For example, suppose goods A and B are similar in that the cost of producing high quality is
equal, 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵 , and the probability that low quality is detected depends solely on the total
number of low quality goods sold by that firm, 𝑘, 𝑠𝐴𝑖 (𝑘) = 𝑠𝐵𝑖 (𝑘) = 𝑠𝐴𝐵𝑖 (𝑘⁄2 , 𝑘⁄2) . Under
𝐵
those assumptions, there would be an equilibrium in which each consumer purchased randomly
from all firms, but in which the probability with which the consumer purchased from each
single-good firm was twice the probability with which the consumer purchased from each twogood firm. If consumers behaved in this fashion, each two-product firm would sell half as much
of each good as each single-product firm. So the total sales (A and B combined) of the twoproduct firms would equal the sales of the single-product firm. So the quality-assuring price for
both products would be the same for two-product and one-product firms. While interesting, this
equilibrium assumes implausible consumer behavior
So far, this paper has assumed that consumers value high quality so much that they would
buy it even at the price offered by single-product firms. As Rasmusen (2016) points out,
however, it is possible that consumers will prefer low quality to high quality at the qualityassuring price that could be offered by a single-product firm. The existence of multi-product
firms can, in some circumstances, solve this problem by lowering the quality-assuring price. In
this way, umbrella branding (the use of a single trademark for several products sold by the same
firm) makes high quality viable in situations where, if the same product were sold by a singleproduct firm, high quality would require a quality-assuring price that consumers were unwilling
to pay. Note, contrary to Rasmusen, umbrella branding makes high quality viable even in the
presence of perfect competition.
While this section focused on umbrella branding, the law firm size issue explored by
Iacobucci (2012) is analytically identical. Instead of a manufacturer making two goods, he
considers a law firm producing two kinds of legal services, where the two services are
distinguished by the fact that each is produced by a different lawyer. Nevertheless, the model
would be the same. For each lawyer, there is a probability that low quality will be detected. If
consumers punish both lawyers in a firm if they detect low quality by one lawyer, then low
quality is likely to be punished more swiftly in a multi-member firm. This enables the multimember firm to credibly offer high quality at a lower quality-assuring price than either lawyer
could offer if she practiced alone.
5. Reputational Economics of Scale in a Finite-Horizon Model
This section shows that reputational economies of scale exist also, under some
circumstances, in a finite-horizon model similar to those pioneered by Kreps and Wilson (1982)
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and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In this model, there are two types of firms, good and bad.
Firms know their types, but consumers do not know firm types. Good firms always sell highquality goods, even if doing so is not profitable, while bad firms are opportunistic and sell high
quality only if it maximizes the present discounted value of their profits. The literature
sometimes calls good firms “commitment type” firms, while bad firms are “strategic type” firms.
With probability 𝜃, a firm is good, and with probability 1 − 𝜃 a firm is bad. 0 < 𝜃 < 1. Assume
that high quality goods cost 𝑐 to produce, 0 < 𝑐 < 1, while low quality goods cost zero to
produce. Consumers are willing to pay 𝑣 for high quality goods and zero for low quality goods.
If consumers are uncertain about the quality of goods, the price they are willing to pay is
proportional to the probability that they think quality will be high. So, if consumers think only
good firms will sell high quality, and they cannot distinguish between good and bad firms, they
are willing to pay 𝜃𝑣. As in the main model, let 𝑠(𝑘) be the probability that consumers detect
and punish low quality, where 𝑘 is the number of low quality units sold, 𝑠(𝑘) = 0 ,
lim 𝑠(𝑞) = 1, 𝑠′ > 0, and 𝑠 ′′ < 0. Note that these assumptions imply that if a firm sells any
𝑞→∞

low-quality goods, then 0 < 𝑠 < 1. There is only one firm. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
firm sells either all high quality or all low quality, so 𝑘 = 𝑞.14 The firm sets the price, and
consumers decide whether or not to buy. The discount factor is 𝛿, 0 < 𝛿 < 1. Consumers know
all parameters – 𝜃, 𝑐, 𝑠, 𝑣, and 𝛿 – but consumers do not know what type a firm is. For
convenience, if the payoffs to high and low quality are the same, it is assumed that the bad firm
sells high quality.
Consider first a one-period game. Obviously, the bad firm will sell low quality and the
good firm will sell high quality. As a result, because the firm sets the price, the price will be 𝜃𝑣.
Now consider the incentive-compatibility constraint of a bad firm in a two-period game.
The bad firm will sell high quality at price 𝑣 if doing so maximizes the present discounted value
of its profits. Assuming that consumers will believe it sells high quality in the first period (an
assumption justified below), the bad firm will sell high quality if:
𝑣 − 𝑐 + 𝛿𝜃𝑣 ≥ 𝑣 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜃𝑣

(5)

The left side represents the bad firm’s profits if it sells high quality in the first period and it is
believed to sell high quality. It gets 𝑣 in the first period (the price consumers are willing to pay
for high quality), and it pays c to produce it. Because it sold high quality in the first period,
consumers are willing to purchase from it in the second period. Nevertheless, because consumers

14

No proof of the irrationality of mixing high and low quality is provided for this model, but
there is no reason to think the proof in Appendix A would not, with appropriate modifications, apply to
this model as well. As with the infinitely repeated model, the key is that the second derivative of 𝑠(𝑘) is
negative. This means that the marginal cost of low quality (detection) is decreasing in quantity. Since the
marginal benefit of low quality (cost savings) is constant with respect to quantity, if it is profitable to
produce one unit of low quality, it is profitable to produce all low quality.
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know that the bad firm will sell low quality in the second (last) period, and since they do not
know whether the firm is low quality, the price in the last period is 𝜃𝑣, as in the one-period
game. Since it costs the bad firm nothing to sell low quality, its discounted profits in the second
period are 𝛿𝜃𝑣. If the bad firm sells low quality in the first period, it gets profits of 𝑣 (the price
of high quality minus the costs of production, which are zero). Low quality is detected with
probability s, and consumers rationally do not purchase from bad firms in the last period, so the
present-discounted second-period profits are 𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜃𝑣.
Rearranging the terms of expression (5), the bad firm sells high quality in the first period
𝑐
if 𝑣 ≥ 𝜃𝛿𝑠 . That is, as long as 𝑣 is sufficiently high, high quality is rational. Note the effect of 𝑠.
As 𝑠 goes up, the inequality is satisfied for a larger set of the parameter space. That is, the
inequality is satisfied for lower values of 𝑣, 𝜃, and 𝛿 and for higher values of 𝑐. Since 𝑠 is an
increasing function of quantity, 𝑞, and because the firm will set price equal to 𝑣, this means that,
as under the infinitely repeated game model analyzed in prior sections, the lowest price
consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint is lower for large firms than for small ones
and thus there are there are reputational economies of scale.
Note also that quantity manifests itself in (5) only through 𝑠, the probability that bad
quality in at least one product will be detected. If, as in the infinite-horizon model, bad quality
was detected with certainty, 𝑠 = 1, quantity would be irrelevant. There would be no reputational
economies of scale. A firm producing one good per period would behave in the same way as a
firm producing a million goods per period, and a small firm would be just as trustworthy as a
large one. As with the infinite-horizon model of reputation, the key to reputational economies of
scale is the idea that poor quality is more likely to be detected and punished when quantity is
high.
If the incentive-compatibility constraint (5) is satisfied, as in Kreps and Wilson’s model,
it is equilibrium behavior for bad firms to mimic good firms in the first period, and it is rational
for consumers to believe that bad firms, under some parameters, sell high quality, except in the
last period. More formally, it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a bad firm to sell high quality
in the first period for 𝑣 and for a bad firm to sell low quality in the last period for 𝜃𝑣. In this
equilibrium, consumers purchase goods for a price of 𝑣 in the first period, and purchase goods
for 𝜃𝑣 in the second period, unless a firm has been detected as having sold low quality in the first
period, in which case consumers refuse to buy from the firm in the second period (or buy only at
price zero). If consumers in the first period do not buy at the prices stated above, the firm does
not sell in the second period. If firms sell at prices other than those stated above, consumers do
not buy anything. Appropriate beliefs can be constructed to make these off-equilibrium-path
behaviors rational.
We can now generalize to any number of periods.
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Proposition 4. There are reputational economies of scale in the finite-horizon model
when low quality is detected with probability less than one, there is more than one
period, and bad types either produce low quality in all periods or produce high quality in
all but the last period.
Proof. The incentive-compatibility constraint for the two-period game is (5) above, and
it has already been shown that it is satisfied for a lower price as quantity and thus 𝑠
increases. The key part of the incentive-compatibility constraint in the n-period game
where 𝑛 ≥ 2 is:
∑𝑖=𝑛−2
𝛿 𝑖 (𝑣 − 𝑐) + 𝛿 𝑛−1 𝜃𝑣 ≥ ∑𝑖=𝑛−2
𝛿 𝑖 (1 − 𝑠)𝑖 𝑣 + 𝛿 𝑛−1 (1 − 𝑠)𝑛−1 𝜃𝑣 (6)
𝑖=0
𝑖=0
Note, however, that satisfying inequality (6) is not sufficient to show that it is an
equilibrium for a bad type to sell high quality in all but the last period. For that to be a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it is necessary that the inequality also hold in periods less
than 𝑛 but greater than 1. For example, if inequality (6) held for 𝑛 = 3 but inequality (5)
did not for 𝑛 = 2, it would not be a sequentially rational equilibrium, and thus not a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, for a bad type to sell high quality in the second to last
period of the three period game, so (6) would not be sufficient to show an equilibrium in
which a bad type sold high quality in all but the last period. Fortunately, it is easy
relatively easy to show that if inequality (5) is true, inequality (6) will be true for all 𝑛 ≥
𝑐
2. As noted above, for the two-period game, inequality (5) is trues when 𝑣 ≥ 𝜃𝛿𝑠. If that
same inequality holds, (6) will hold for 𝑛 ≥ 2. Proof by induction. We already know that
the inequality holds for 𝑛 = 2. Denote the payoff from selling high quality in the first 𝑎
periods and low quality in the last 𝑏 periods as 𝜋𝑏𝑎 . Using this notation, (6) can be
rewritten as:
0
(𝑣 − 𝑐) + 𝛿𝜋1𝑛−2 ≥ 𝑣 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜋𝑛−1
,
which can be rewritten as:
0
0
−𝑐 + 𝛿𝜋1𝑛−2 ≥ 𝛿𝜋𝑛−1
− 𝑠𝛿𝜋𝑛−1
.
𝑛−2
0
By the inductive premise, we can assume 𝜋1 ≥ 𝛿𝜋𝑛−1, so it is sufficient to prove that
𝑐
𝑐
0
0
when 𝑣 ≥ 𝜃𝛿𝑠, −𝑐 ≥ −𝑠𝛿𝜋𝑛−1
. The inequality to prove simplifies to 𝜋𝑛−1
≥ 𝑠𝛿. It is
𝑐

𝑐

0
0
obvious from (6) that 𝜋𝑛−1
≥ 𝑣. Note also that 𝜃𝛿𝑠 ≥ 𝑠𝛿 because 0 < 𝜃 < 1. So 𝜋𝑛−1
≥
𝑐

𝑠𝛿

𝑐

𝑐

whenever 𝑣 ≥ 𝜃𝛿𝑠. Thus, (6) is satisfied whenever 𝑣 ≥ 𝜃𝛿𝑠, which means the condition

is satisfied for a larger set of the parameter space as 𝑠 and thus quantity increases.
Q.E.D.15
15

It is also noteworthy that expression (6) is also satisfied for a larger set of the parameter space
as quantity and thus 𝑠 increases, but this is not important, because, as noted above, all that matters is that
(6) will be satisfied whenever (5) is satisfied, and (5). The proof that expression (6) is also more likely to
be satisfied as quantity follows simply from the fact that quantity appears only via 𝑠 and 𝑠 appears only
on the right side of inequality (6). The derivative of the right side with respect to 𝑠 is negative. So, as 𝑠
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Appendix 2 also considers equilibria in which the firm sells high quality in the first
period, but switches to low quality before the last period. Reputational economies of scale do not
generalize to such equilibria.
6. Caveats, Extensions, and Diseconomies of Scale
The models in this paper are, like all models, unrealistic in some respects. A key way in
which these models are unrealistic is that they assume that if the firm chooses to sell with high
quality, no low quality goods are sold. That is unrealistic, because even the best quality control
cannot prevent production of an occasional defective product. Relaxing this assumption will
reinforce the reputational advantage of larger firms because consumers can more easily discern
whether defects are endemic or idiosyncratic when the firm sells a large number of goods. For
example, if a firm sells ten goods and one is of poor quality, consumers cannot infer with
confidence that the firm has bad quality control because it is possible that the one good of poor
quality reflects simply bad luck from a firm that sells high quality goods with probability much
higher than 90%. On the other hand, if a firm sells one million goods and one hundred thousand
are defective, the consumer can very reliably infer that the firm has poor quality controls that
result in a high (10%) rate of defects.16
An interesting extension of the analysis in this article applies to certification marks.
Certification marks are a type of trademark in which one entity uses its reputation to back the
idea that products sold by others meet certain quality standards (Holtzman 1991). Examples
include marks such as Underwriter’s Laboratory (for electrical safety) and the Union of
Orthodox Rabbis (for kosher food). One puzzle is why certification is necessary. Why isn’t the
reputation of the company producing the goods sufficient to ensure quality? One possibility is
that certification is helpful when the probably that low quality will be detected is very low. In
that situation, the reputation of a single firm, even a large one, may not be sufficient to bond
good behavior. The theory of umbrella branding set out in Section 5 is helpful here. Just as a firm
producing two goods may be in a better position to bond the reputation of its products, so a
certifier who certifies hundreds of goods may be in a better position to bond the reputation of all
those products. If consumers blame the certifier when one of the certified firms is detected as
shirking, then the certifier has an incentive to closely monitor all the firms it certifies, and
consumers will rationally trust certified products more than uncertified. In this way, the
effectiveness of certification is an application of the idea of reputational economies of scale.
When the probability of detection is very low, the quantity sold by a single firm may not be
sufficient to ensure high quality. Spreading the reputational umbrella of the certifier over the
goods sold by multiple firms restores reputational incentives. This may explain why certification
goes up, inequality (6), is satisfied for a greater variant of parameters. Since the derivative of both leftand right-hand sides with respect to 𝑣 is positive, this means that inequality (6) is satisfied for lower
values of 𝑣 as 𝑠 goes up. Since the derivative of 𝑠 with respect to 𝑞 is positive, this means that inequality
(6) is satisfied for lower values of 𝑣 as quantity goes up
16
The authors thank Steve Shavell for making the point in this paragraph.
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is especially prevalent for credence attributes, such as safety or kashrut, where even discerning
consumers cannot tell whether the producer has shirked simply by consuming or experiencing
the good (Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter 2011).17
Although this paper suggests that larger firms are likely to be more trustworthy, that, of
course, does not mean they never commit fraud or pass off low quality for high quality or engage
in other misconduct. A key issue is the probability of detection. When misconduct is detected
with low probability, even reputation may not be sufficient to incentivize good behavior. It is an
advantage of the models in this paper that they explicitly take into account the probability of
detection, whereas much of the previous literature assumed detection with certainty.
Another key requirement for reputational enforcement is that those affected by bad
behavior punish the firm by refusing to deal with the firm in the future. While, as this paper
shows, punishment can be part of an equilibrium, it is not the only one. If those affected by a
firm’s misbehavior believe that the firm will behave better in the future – perhaps because of a
change in management or because of government regulation – then reputational constraints, and
thus reputational economies of scale, are likely to fail (Macey 2013; Shapira & Zingales 2017).
In addition, reputation models depend heavily on discount rates. If short-term gains are
weighted more heavily than long-term ones, reputational constraints are much less likely to
work. A key complication related to discount rates is whose discount rate matters in complex
organizations. If managers tend to have short time horizons, while the firm and its shareholders
value the long term, much will depend on agency costs and the extent to which firms are able to
align managerial incentives with the long-term interest of the firm. In this regard, there may, in
fact, be reputational diseconomies of scale. If larger firms have more difficulty aligning
managerial interests with shareholder interests, reputational constraints may, in fact, be less
binding on them. Or, if one looks at reputation from the perspective of the finite-horizon model,
where there are good (“commitment”) types and bad (“strategic”) types, it is plausible to think
that some individuals or small firms may be committed to good behavior, regardless of profit,
but that seems implausible for larger organizations.
7. Conclusion
Relaxing the assumption that low quality is detected with certainty helps explain the
widely presumed phenomenon of reputational economies of scale. If low quality is detected with
probability less than one, reputational economies of scale emerge under the infinitely repeated
game model of reputation, even in competitive markets. Similarly, if one drops the assumption
that low quality is detected with certainty, reputational economies of scale also occur in a finitehorizon game model of reputation with two types where high quality is sold in all but the last
17

Dan Klerman thanks Megan Stevenson for encouraging him to include this paragraph, which,
in fact, motivated his interest in reputational economies of scale.
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period. Reputational economies of scale help explain many market phenomena, including
gatekeeper liability, one-sided consumer contracts, umbrella branding, and the large size of firms
in industries where product quality is hard to enforce through inspection or contract.
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Appendix A. No Mixing of High and Low Quality
The main text (and other articles in the literature) assume that a manufacturer that sells a
single good sells either all high quality or all low quality of that good. Similarly, it is generally
assumed that a manufacturer who sells two goods, A and B, sells uniform quality of A and
uniform quality of B. That is, the text and literature assume that, although a firm may sell high
quality A and low quality B, or low quality A and high quality B, the firm does not sell some
high quality A and some low quality A and/or some high quality B and some low quality B.
Given the assumption of fixed costs, F, that assumption may be reasonable. Perhaps producing
some high and some low quality would require duplication of the fixed costs (or at least
additional fixed costs). On the other hand, given the assumption that the marginal cost, c, is
constant, no matter how many units are sold, it is also reasonable to consider the possibility that
the manufacturer would choose to sell some high and some low-quality goods.
First consider the umbrella branding case, where there are two goods. To show that
mixing is not rational, one must prove the following inequality:
′∗
′∗
𝑞𝐴𝑖 (𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑞𝐵𝑖 (𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )

𝑟

≥

′∗
′∗
′∗
′∗
(𝑞𝐴𝑖 −𝑘𝐴𝑖 )(𝑝𝐴
−𝑐𝐴 )+𝑘𝐴𝑖 𝑝𝐴
+(𝑞𝐵𝑖 −𝑘𝐵 )(𝑝𝐵
−𝑐𝐵 )+𝑘𝐵𝑖 𝑝𝐵

𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 ,𝑘𝐵𝑖 )

(A1)

Note that if 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 0 that the left and right sides of the above expression would be equal.
Note also that, given conditions C1, C2, and C3, if 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑞𝐴𝑖 and/or 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 𝑞𝐵𝑖 , the left and right
sides of the above expression are either equal or the right side is smaller. The inequality can be
rewritten as:
′∗
0 ≥ 𝑟(𝑘𝐴𝑖 + 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑘𝐵 𝑐𝐵 ) − 𝑠𝐴𝐵 (𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ) [𝑞𝐴 (𝑝′∗
𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 ) + 𝑞𝐵 (𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 )] (A2)
𝑖

𝑖

Like A1, the right and left sides of A2 are equal when 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 0. Similarly, if 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑞𝐴𝑖
and/or 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 𝑞𝐵𝑖 , the left and right sides of the above expression are either equal or the right side
is smaller. As a result, it is sufficient to prove that the second partial second derivatives of the
right-hand side with respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 and 𝑘𝐵𝑖 are positive. Since the expressions are identical with
respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 and 𝑘𝐵𝑖 , it sufficient to prove the second derivative with respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 is positive.
The second derivative with respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 is:
−

𝑑 2 𝑠𝐴𝐵
[𝑞 (𝑝′∗ − 𝑐𝐴 ) + 𝑞𝐵 (𝑝′∗
𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 )]
𝑖
𝑑2 𝑘𝐴𝑖 𝐴𝑖 𝐴

Since the first term (the second derivative of 𝑠𝐴𝐵 ) is negative, and the second term (in square
brackets) is positive, the negative of the product of the two terms is positive. Q.E.D.
The one good case, where the manufacturer sells only one good, follows easily from the
proof above. To prove that a firm would not sell some high and some low quality, just remove
24

any terms with B subscripts and then remove all the A and AB subscripts. The proof then follows
in exactly the same way.
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Appendix B. Reputational Economies of Scale for Any Number of Periods in the Finite Horizon
Game when the Bad Type produces low quality in the more than just the last period.
Consider a three-period game based on the model in Section 5. There are two cases to
consider, where 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠, so the bad firm can be assumed to sell high quality in the second
𝑐
period if low quality is not detected in the first period, and where 𝑣 < 𝜃𝛿𝑠 so the bad firm can be
𝑐

assumed to sell low quality in the second period. The situation where 𝑣 ≥ 𝜃𝛿𝑠 is considered in
𝑐

the main text. Consider the three-period game where 𝑣 < 𝜃𝛿𝑠, that is, where the bad firm will
sell low quality in the second and third periods. As in Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) model, it is
possible that the bad firm will sell high quality in the first period, even though it will sell low
quality in later periods. Such an equilibrium would be plausible if the incentive-compatibility
constraint is satisfied:
𝑣 − 𝑐 + 𝛿𝜃𝑣 +

𝛿 2 (1 − 𝑠)𝜃𝑣
𝛿 2 (1 − 𝑠)2 𝜃𝑣
≥ 𝑣 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜃𝑣 +
1 − s(1 − 𝜃)
1 − s(1 − 𝜃)

(8)

As before, the left side is the payoff if the bad firm sells high quality in the first period,
but not in any other period, whereas the right side is the payoff if the bad firm sells low quality in
all periods. The last term of each side of (8) is slightly different than (6) because one must take
into account the Bayesian inferences that consumers can draw from the fact that low quality has
not been detected in the first two periods, under the assumption that consumers expect the firm to
sell high quality in the first period and low quality in the second and third periods.
(8) simplifies to:
𝑣≥

𝑐
𝛿𝜃𝑠[1+

𝛿(1−𝑠)
]
1−𝑠(1−𝜃)

(9)

If there are reputational economies of scale, the derivative of the right-hand side would always
be negative, which means that the derivative of the denominator would be positive. The
derivative of the denominator is:
𝛿𝜃 [1 + 𝛿

1−2𝑠+𝑠2 (1−𝜃)
]
[1−𝑠(1−𝜃)]2

(10)

That is positive if:
1 + 𝛿 − 2𝑠[(1 − 𝜃) + 𝛿] + 𝑠 2 [(1 − 𝜃)2 + 𝛿(1 − 𝜃)] > 0

(11)

That expression, however, will be false when s and 𝛿 are close to one and 𝜃 takes
intermediate values. For example, if 𝑠 = 0.9, 𝛿 = 0.9, and 𝜃 = 0.5, the left-hand side of (11)
would be negative 0.053, which would mean there would not be reputational economies of scale.
Of course, for many parameters, expression (11) is true and there are reputational economies of
26

scale, but such reputational economies of scale are not, as in the models examined in sections 25, a general phenomenon.
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